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NOTES
USE OF AN ARBITRATION CLAUSE AS A DEFENSE TO 8(a)(5)
CHARGE RESULTING FROM THE EMPLOYER'S REFUSAL TO
BARGAIN WHEN ACTING UNILATERALLY WITH RESPECT TO
A MANDATORY SUBJECT OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
I. THE PROBLEM SITUATION
This note concerns the problem situation which arises in an employer-
union relationship where the collective-bargaining contract in force in-
cludes a mandatory arbitration procedure for resolving grievances arising
under the contract.' The contemplated problem arises when the employer
acts unilaterally with respect to a mandatory subject cf collective bargain-
ing,2 for example by instituting a wage incentive plan. The union then
1. In Knight Morley Corp., 116 N.L.R.B. 140 (1956), af'd, 251 F.2d 753 (6th
Cir. 1957), the Board referred to an arbitration clause which said a grievance "may"
be arbitrated as a "permissive" arbitration clause.
But see, Bonnet v. Congress of Independent Unions, Loc-i 14, 331 F.2d 355, 359
(Sth Cir. 1964), where the court said: "We should mention, perhaps, the union's
suggestion that the bargaining agreement does not compel arbitration but only provides
either party 'may' request it; that it is thus permissive and optional. . . . The result
claimed to follow is that the arbitration here is not mandatory. We think the result
is necessarily the other way. . . . The presence of this or similar language has not
prevented the conclusion that a claim, if pressed, is compulsorily subject to arbitration.
. . .The Fifth Circuit has flatly rejected the union's argument. Deaton Truck Line,
Inc. v. Local 612 etc., International Bhd. of Teamsters, 314 F.2d 418, 422 (5 Cir. 1962)
(sic.). We agree."
See also, General Drivers, Warehousemen, and Helpers, Local 89 v. Riss and
Company, Inc.., 372 U.S. 517 (1963), where the Supreme Court held that the fact that'the
word "arbitration" was not contained in the collective agreement was not a bar to
enforcement under § 301 of a decision by the "Joint Area Cartage Committee" which
was in accordance with the grievance procedure contained in the agreement.
These cases indicate that there is no distinction between mandatory or permissive
arbitration clauses, nor is there any requirement that the grievance procedure be called
an arbitration procedure. The primary consideration is whether the parties have mutually
agreed on a method to solve their disputes.
2. The original statutory definition of mandatory subjects of collective bargaining
is ". . . rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employ-
ment. . . ." The National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (1964).
This broad definition has been interpreted by the Board to encompass such areas
as incentive wages, John W. Bolton & Sons, Inc., 91 N.L.R.B. 989 (1950); recall of
employees, West Boylston Mfg. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 808 (1949); board, Weyerhaeuser
Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672 (1949); shift schedules, Massey Gin & Machine Works,
Inc., 78 N.L.R.B. 189 (1948); piece rates, Southshore Packng Corp., 73 N.L.R.B.
1116 (1947) ; and work loads, Woodside Cotton Mills Co., 21 I\.L.R.B. 42 (1940).
"The present philosophy of the Board indicates that any decision to change opera-
tions that would substantially affect employment falls within the purview of 'terms
and conditions of employment' and is therefore a mandatory subject of bargaining."
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demands to bargain over the question, which the employer refuses to do
on the grounds that his action is allowed under the terms of the collective-
bargaining contract. The union, not wanting to arbitrate this matter for
reasons of its own, files 8(a) (1) and (5) charges with the National
Labor Relations Board.' This note will examine the extent to which the
employer can invoke the arbitration clause in the existing collective-
bargaining contract to gain a stay of Board action, a dismissal of the
charges before the Board, or on appeal to a federal court, secure a reversal
of an adverse Board decision."
The three types of collective-bargaining contract clauses which are
most important to the problem situation are the arbitration clause, the
management prerogative clause, and the waiver of the duty to bargain
clause. Generally, arbitration procedure provides for a multi-step pro-
cessing of grievances which ultimately culminates in arbitration.5 The
purpose of the multi-step procedure is to settle minor grievances at a su-
Mandatory Subjects of Bargaining, Operational Changes, 17 U. FLA. L. REv. 109, 118
(1964-65).
3. "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(l) to interfere with,
restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in § 7; . . . (5)
to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to
the provisions of § 9(a)." The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 8(a),
49 Stat. 452 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1964).
4. The question presented by this note is not similar to the question decided in
Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). In Spielberg, at the time of the Board
action there was an existing arbitration decision concerning the question to the Board.
The Board decided it would not upset the arbitration decision where ". . . the pro-
ceedings appear to have been fair and regular, all parties had agreed to be bound, and
the decision . . . is not clearly repugnant to the purposes and policies of the Act.
Id. at 1082.
In the problem situation of this note there is neither a pre-existing decision by an
arbitrator nor has an attempt been made to have the grievance arbitrated.
5. A typical example of multi-step grievance procedure is found in W.LIAms,
LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW, REFERENCE SUPPLEMENT 5 (3d ed. 1965). The steps
provided in that agreement are (1) taking the grievance to the foremen, (2) if that
result is not satisfactory, the grievance can then be taken to the "Plant Grievance
Committee" and the "Divisional Superintendent," (3) if that result is not satisfactory
the grievance may be appealed to the "Industrial Relations Manager," (4) if that
result is not satisfactory, "the Union may request that this grievance be submitted to
arbitration," and any "decision or award shall be final and binding on both parties
for the life of this agreement."
See also, Drake Bakeries v. Local 50, American Bakery & Confectionery Workers
International, 370 U.S. 254, 257 (1962); where the opinion gives another example of
multi-step grievance procedure that culminates in arbitration. In Article V of the
contract the parties agreed they would "promptly attempt to adjust all complaints, dis-
putes, or grievances arising between them involving questions of interpretation or
application of any clause. . . ." The procedure outlined is presentation by the "Shop
Chairman" and "Committee" on the union's behalf to the "Shop Management." If
the "Shop Chairman" and "Shop Management" cannot affect a settlement of the
grievance, the Union may present the grievance to the "Plant Manager." If this does
not result in a settlement then "either party shall have the right to refer the matter
to arbitration. .. ."
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pervisory level before going to the expense of a full arbitration hearing.
Usually, the scope of authority of the arbitrator is limited by the collec-
tive-bargaining contract to grievances which arise in the interpretation of
the collective-bargaining contract.6 Under the typical contract the arbi-
trator determines the scope of his authority. Since the famous Steel-
workers Trilogy7 the only viable ground to obtain review of an arbitra-
tor's decision is on the issue of arbitrability, i.e., whether the arbitrator
exceeded the scope of his authority.
The second type of clause bearing on the problem situation is the
management prerogative clause.' The purpose of this clause is to allow
the employer to carry out the general business, make managerial decisions,
and institute limited changes in the operation of thie business without
running afoul of sections 8(a) (5) and 8(d) where such actions would
fall within the scope of a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.
Interpretation of this clause plays a major role in the problem situa-
tion. The employer may in good faith interpret the management prerog-
ative clause as allowing the unilateral action which the union contends is
not permitted by the clause, or he may use the clause as a defense to an
8(a) (5) charge after instituting some type of unilateral action without
having first considered whether it was allowed. The legality of the em-
ployer's action, in either case, turns on interpretation, of a clause in the
collective-bargaining contract and hence is an arbitrable issue.
The third type of clause, the waiver of the duty to bargain clause,
6. "But it is customary for the collective agreement to limit the arbitrator's juris-
diction with apparent strictness. Apart from the specific exclusion of certain subjects,
as, for example, rates for new jobs or production standards, f-e is commonly confined
to the resolution of grievances or disputes as to 'the interpretation or application of the
agreement,' or claims of 'violation of the agreement,' and quite frequently he is further
enjoined not to 'add to, subtract from, or modify any of the terms of the agree-
ment . . .' also that he has 'no power to substitute his discretion where the company
is given discretion . . .' by the agreement, and no power 'to provide agreement for the
parties in those cases where they have in their contract agreed that further negotiations
shall or may provide for certain contingencies.'" Shulman, Rcason, Contract and Law
in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REv. 999, 1008 (1954-55).
7. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574(1960) ; United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
8. There are many different management prerogative clauses. Some are quite
broad: "The right of management in the operation of its business is unlimited except
as may be expressly and specifically restricted by the provisions of this agreement, and
this agreement is the sole agreement between the parties." Square D Co. v. NLRB,
332 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1964).
Other management prerogative clauses are more limited in their scope: "The
Employer reserves the right to pay premium rate over and above the contractual
classified wage rate to reward any particular employee for some special fitness, skill,
aptitude or the like." NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., 351 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1965),
cert. granted, 34 U.S.L. WEEK 3356 (U.S. April 19, 1966).
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waives all rights of the parties to require collective bargaining over any
matter contained in or not contained in the collective-bargaining con-
tract.' However, as will be seen later,1" the Board does not give these
clauses a broad interpretation.
The problem is one of balancing the policy behind the National Labor
Relations Act and the subjective considerations to which the Board often
addresses itself, against the policy promulgated by the Supreme Court
which favors the right of the parties to enter collective-bargaining con-
tracts and establish a mutually acceptable system of self-government
through arbitration procedures. As is evident, contract interpretation is
of primary importance and the issue is which forum (arbitration or the
NLRB) should have the primary authority to make a determination of
the rights under the contract in a particular situation.
II. PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS
Once the unfair labor practice charge has been filed, the employer
may decide that the question of whether he acted in compliance with the
collective-bargaining contract should be arbitrated because past experi-
ence indicates the employer can win in arbitration. However, there are
procedural problems within the collective-bargaining contract and the
law which make it impossible for the employer to force arbitration.
In this situation, the union has the grievance with the employer's
unilateral action, and may choose to force arbitration of the grievance
under section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act." The
9. ". . . [T]he Employer and Union, for the life of this Agreement, each voluntar-
ily and unqualifiedly waives the right and each agrees that the other shall not be obligated
to bargain collectively with respect to any subject matter not specifically referred to or
covered in this agreement, . . . ." NLRB v. C & C Plywood Corp., supra note 8.
"The parties hereto acknowledge that during negotiations which resulted in this
agreement each had unlimited right and opportunity to make demands and proposals
with respect to any subject or matter....
"Therefore, the Company and the Union for the life of this agreement each volun-
tarily and unqualifyingly waives the right . . . to bargain collectively with respect
to any subject or matter referred to, or covered in this agreement, or with respect
ot any subjcet or matter not specifically referred to or covered in this agreement .
Square D Co. v. NLRB, supra note 8.
In many respects a waiver of the duty to bargain clause and the management
prerogative clause are similar. Both literally are a waiver of the duty to bargain. The
difference lies in the situations where each is applicable. The management prerogative
clause only applies to situations where the employer has carried out some unilateral
action which is governed by the management prerogative clause. The waiver of the
duty to bargain clause, however applies even if the employer does not act unilaterally
and the union wants to re-open negotiations with respect to some topic which is either
in the contract or not in the contract. The waiver of the duty to bargain clause is
broader and extends beyond the coverage of management prerogative clause.
10. See, note 20 infra.
11. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1964). "Suits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an
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union can also file 8(a) (1) and (5) unfair labor practice charges with
the Board, while pursuing a section 301 (a) suit in Federal court to com-
pel arbitration. However, the union may elect to pursue its rights solely
before the Board.
The employer on the other hand has no grievance to process pursuant
to the arbitration clause in the collective-bargaining contract since his
action is the cause of the dispute. He has no right3 to pursue under sec-
tion 301(a), and cannot force arbitration of the question. However,
this is not prejudicial if he can win before the Board or reverse an ad-
verse decision on appeal.'2 It is probably to the employer's advantage to
continue the unilateral action as long as possible. If the unilateral action
is in the nature of a wage increase or an employee benefit, the longer the
action continues the more accustomed the employees become to the bene-
fit. If the employer eventually loses, the termination of the benefit may
cause employee animosity toward the union. Also, if the employer
eventually wins the case before the Board or on appeal, the union may be
precluded from arbitration since collective-bargaining contracts commonly
contain a contractual statute of limitation within which the grievance
must be filed or be barred from arbitration."
industry affecting commerce as defined in this act, or between any such labor
organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States having juris-
diction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard
to the citizenship of the parties."
At common law, a party to an arbitration agreement could not secure specific
performance of that agreement, but was compelled to bring suit for money damages.
Realizing that this common law approach was not realistic in die area of labor relations,
the Supreme Court decided in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of
Alabama, 353 U.S. 448 (1956), that the parties to a collective-bargaining contract
could properly under the provisions of section 301(a) sue and acquire a decree for
performance of the arbitration clause in the collective-bargairdng contract.
12. There are two ways the employer can obtain reviEw of the Board's adverse
decision. One method is to refuse to comply with the Board's cease and desist order
and continue the unilateral action without collective bargainir g. In this case the Board
will probably file a petition for enforcement under the provisions of the National Labor
Relations Act § 10(e), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1964), and the
employer will defend his position at that time.
The second method is for the employer to appeal the decision of the Board and
become the party moving forward by filing a petition for rcview under the provisions
of the National Labor Relations Act § 10(f), 49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 160(f)
(1964).
13. "[N]o written grievance shall be valid unless submitted in writing within
five (5) calendar days after the employer knew, or by reascnable diligence could have
known of the facts upon which the grievance was based." Avco Corp., Electronics and
Ordnance Div. v. Mitchell, 336 F.2d 289, 290 (6th Cir. 1964). The court decided in
this case that the procedural question of whether the griev-mce was submitted within
the allowable time period was for the arbitrator to decide, and the Steelworkers Trilogy
precluded review by the court of that decision.
"Section 8. In the event any grievance, dispute or diffe!rence originates in which
the Company regards itself as the aggrieved party, the Company shall take up such
matter within ten (10) days from the occurrence on which such grievance is based,
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
III. NLRB DECISIONS WHICH HAVE PASSED ON THE PROBLEM
SITUATION
The problem situation of this note assumes that the union files an
8(a) (5) charge with the National Labor Relations Board, and either
the union fails to process a grievance within the contractual grievance
procedure, or if such a grievance has been processed it has not yet reached
the stage of arbitration at the time the Board hears the case. Conse-
quently, the Board has three courses of action: (1) The Board can find
that the employer violated section 8(a) (5) and make an appropriate
order to bargain collectively; (2) the Board can find that the employer
did not violate section 8(a) (5) and dismiss the case; (3) the Board can
defer action on the case until certain matters have been arbitrated and
then limit subsequent action to matters outside the arbitrator's decision.
The Board has not clearly established what action should be taken
where the collective-bargaining contract contains an arbitration clause.
One member of the Board has attempted to articulate a set of criteria to
follow where there is a conflict between Board remedies and collective-
bargaining contract arbitration procedure. In his concurring opinion to
Cloverleaf Division of Adams Dairy,4 Member Brown agreed with the
majority that there had been a violation of sections 8(a) (1) and (5) of
the NLRA; however, he did not agree with the majority reasoning. He
said ". . . a significant number of recent cases have dealt with the
Board's function under the Act where a dispute arises which may be both
a violation of the Act and an arguable breach of the collective-bargaining
agreement subject to arbitration."' Stressing the need for criteria in
this area to determine when the Board should pass on the unfair labor
practice charges or when it should step aside for arbitration, Member
Brown stated that ". . . if after an [arbitration] award has been ren-
dered there is a request for Board action, our consideration of the case
would be controlled by Spielberg."'6  He then went on to formulate his
criteria for situations where the Board should defer to arbitration:
with the president of the Association"' Amalgamated Association of Street, Electric
Ry. and Motor Coach Employees of America v. Trailways of New England, Inc., 232
F. Supp. 608, 609 (D. Mass. 1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 815 (1st Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 879 (1965).
The arbitrator is not required to decide procedural questions in the first instance
before hearing the substantive evidence concerning the grievance. Rochester Telephone
Corp. v. Communications Workers of America, 340 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1965).
In light of these cases, it is doubtful that the employer's contention that the union
is barred from presenting the grievance would be sustained where the Board had
specifically deferred to arbitration.
14. 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964).
15. Id. at 1420.
16. Id. at 1423. For the Board's position in Spielberg Mfg. Co., see note 4 supra.
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Wherever the record established that the parties to the dis-
pute as part of their collective-bargaining relationship, con-
sciously, by contract, bargaining history, or past practice have
waived statutory rights, bargained such rights away, or bar-
gained to agreement with respect to the subject matter of the
dispute, I believe we should leave to the arbitrator the question
of the nature of their bargain and the respective rights and
obligations of each party.
Where, however, the parties have not by practice, bargain-
ing history, or contract resolved their respective rights and
obligations with respect to the subject matter of the dispute,
we should not defer action on the unfair labor practice case
even though the dispute may be generally subject to the arbitra-
tion provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement."
Member Brown would require more than the mere existence of an
arbitration clause in the collective-bargaining contract which covers the
subject matter of the unilateral action before the Board would refuse to
entertain the action because the ". . . existence of an arbitration clause
alone might result in the denial or delay in the exercise of all statutory
rights not guaranteed by the contract."" Member Brown's criteria are
noteworthy if for no other reason than to show at least one member of
the Board's concern to formulate guidelines in a rather nebulous area of
labor law.
Abstractly, Member Brown's position reflects a certain logic. If
the parties bargain to agreement on a topic and that later becomes the
subject of a dispute, the only remaining question is what that agreement
was. The employer should not be required to rebargain the matter. Also,
if the parties expressly waive rights to bargain over topics why should the
Board allow one party to draw back from his agreemcent?"9
It should be indicated, however, that the present posture of Board
decisions does not give Member Brown's criteria much room to operate.
First, no case has been found where the Board decided there was a waiver
of the duty to bargain. Even in cases where there was an express clause
stating that the parties waived their rights to require collective bargain-
ing the Board has found that there was no waiver of the duty to bar-
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. There is no practical difference between waiving the right to require
collective bargaining and the bargaining away of the right to require collective bargain-
ing. Member Brown made the distinction when he posed his criteria, but in this dis-
cussion they will be treated as synomymous.
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gain.2" Given the Board's position on waivers of the duty to bargain,
this part of Member Brown's criteria is practically meaningless. Second,
rarely do the parties to a collective-bargaining contradt come to any real
agreement as to the meaning of the broad general clauses contained in the
agreement.2" Member Brown's criteria appear to require a clear indica-
tion of agreement from the history of the labor-management bargaining
relationship. However, in most cases coming before the Board one will
have difficulty finding such a clear agreement between the parties. As a
result, under Member Brown's text, the Board will entertain the action
with the result that no arbitration will occur.
It has long been the position of the Board that where the parties
have bargained to complete agreement and the collective-bargaining con-
tract clearly reflects that such an agreement has been reached allowing a
specific unilateral action, there is no violation of section 8 (a) (5) even if
the unilateral action is a mandatory subject of collective bargaining.22 In
this situation it is not even necessary for the employer to argue the arbi-
tration question28 because if the action is clearly allowed the arbitrator
will undoubtedly come to the same result as the Board on the question,
and the union will probably not attempt to arbitrate the question. Al-
though it can be argued that the arbitrator may not agree with the
Board's interpretation, case analysis indicates that the Board is a great
deal more strict in finding allowable unilateral action than most arbitra-
20. In C & C Plywood Corp., 148 N.L.R.B. 414 (1964), rev'd, 351 F.2d 224 (9th
Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 34 U.S.L. WEIx 3356 (U.S. April 19, 1966) the Board
either did not know the waiver of the duty to bargain clause was in the contract or
ignored this fact completely because the clause is not mentioned in the Board's decision.
The Board merely said it would not infer a waiver of the duty to bargain. The waiver
of the duty to bargain clause is quoted and discussed by the Federal Court when this
case was appealed. N.L.R.B. v. C & C Plywood Corp., 351 F.2d 223 (9th Cir. 1965),
cert. granted, 34 U.S.L. WEExK 3356 (U.S. April 19, 1966).
Even in cases where the Board has taken cognizance of the waiver of the duty to
bargain clause, the Board has not had difficulty rejecting the contention that the union
waived its right to require collective bargaining. In Square D Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 332
(1963), rev'd, 332 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1964) the Board affirmed the Trial Examiner's
reasoning that a general waiver of the duty to bargain clause was not sufficient to
waive rights over a specific grievance. The waiver clause must specifically refer to
that type of grievance 'before there is "clear, unmistakable, and unequivocal language
which the Board will recognize as a waiver." Id. at 336.
21. "The pressure to reach agreement is so great that the parties are often willing
to contract although each knows that the other places a different meaning upon the
words and they share only the common intent to postpone the issue and take a gamble
upon an arbitrator's ruling if decision is required." Cox, Reflections Upon Labor
Arbitratioi , 72 HAgv. L. REv. 1482, 1491 (1958-59).
22. See, Ador Corp., 150 N.L.R.B. No. 161 (1965), which rearticulates this position.
23. In General Motors Corp., 149 N.L.R.B. No. 40 (1964), the employer did not
argue the question of arbitration of the dispute apparently because the language of the
collective-bargaining contract was so clear that there was little doubt that the Board
would dismiss the charges.
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tors. Therefore, this portion of Member Brown's criteria, where ap-
plicable, is not an aid to the arbitration procedure under the collective-
bargaining contract because the only cases which will be arbitrated are
those where the action is clearly allowed and there is no real grievance
to be arbitrated.
Where the collective-bargaining contract lacked any language which
could reasonably be construed as allowing the unilateral action in ques-
tion,2" or where the employer indicated during negotiation that he does
not interpret the collective-bargaining contract as allowing the unilateral
action subsequently taken,25 the argument that the Board should defer to
arbitration has been rejected by the Board. In these situations the arbi-
tration argument by the employer is quite obviously an attempt to avoid
a clear violation of section 8 (a) (5).
The difficult area is where the collective-bargaining contract con-
tains language which could be construed to allow the unilateral action by
the employer, although the contract does not clearly or specifically allow
the unilateral action. It is in this hazy zone of coatract interpretation
that the Board has not articulated a clear set of criteria to determine
where it will act or step aside to allow arbitration.
Case analysis indicates that in this hazy zone where there is no clear
case one way or the other, the Board looks to one or more factors which
tilt the scales either toward immediate Board action or toward deferring
to arbitration. The most complete list of factors is found in American
Oil Co.,2" where the Board adopted the Trial Examiner's intermediate re-
port which listed several factors which influenced his decision. These
factors were:
(1) . . . the evidence of the collective bargaining history be-
tween the parties [the parties had had an amicabl.a relationship] ;
(2) the economic considerations which motivated the Respon-
dent's [employer's] decision; (3) the evidence of the employer's
past practices, and the union's knowledge, concerning the use of
common carriers; (4) the absence of any anti-union or other
discriminatory mnotive [emphasis added]; (5) the lack of any
evidence of 'significant detriment' to the unit drivers of the
use of common carriers; (6) the absence of any actual change
in the terms and conditions of employment of the unit drivers,
as a result of Respondent's unilateral action; (7I the opportun-
ity afforded the union during negotiations of the various con-
24. See, Smith Cabinate Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1506 (19(4).
25. See, Cloverleaf Division of Adams Dairy, 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964).
26. 155 N.L.R.B. No. 64 (1965).
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tracts to bargain about the use of common carriers; (8) and
finally, Respondent's willingness, announced to the union be-
fore the close of the hearing, to discuss any matters wished to
negotiate .... 2
One additional factor not included in this list, but which is often
pointed out by the Board, is the employer's past record concerning arbi-
tration of similar or identical grievances. Where the employer has pre-
viously asserted before the arbitrator that such a grievance is not an
arbitrable issue or where the employer has attempted to frustrate the
whole arbitration process by refusing to process grievances, the Board is
hostile to the argument that the arbitrator should now be allowed to de-
cide a similar grievance."
Of the eight factors presented by this case, it should be noted that
four of them, (1), (2), (4) and (8), concern the employer's relationship
with the union. All four of these factors show a good and amicable
working relationship with the union without any intention to undermine
the union's position. This consideration is also present where the em-
ployer has not tried to frustrate the arbitration process by refusing to
process grievances or by questioning jurisdiction.
An examination of all the cases found embracing the problem situa-
tion where the Board found there was no 8(a) (5) violation or where the
Board deferred to allow arbitration, indicates that the Board looks to,
makes mention of, and is swayed by the actions of the employer toward
the union and the existence of an amicable relationship between the par-
ties. Where the Board did not believe the employer was consciously carry-
ing out the campaign to undermine the union,2" where the Board could
find no "bad faith" in the employer's interpretation of the contract and
belief the action was allowed,"0 where there was a reasonable interpreta-
tion with no anti-union animus,3 or where the employer had a good bar-
gaining record with the union and had not violated any of the rights
guaranteed in section 7 of the NLRA,3" the Board has accepted the em-
ployer's defense that the dispute is one which should be arbitrated rather
than decided by the Board.
27. Ibid.
28. See, Leroy Machine Co., Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964); and Cloverleaf
Division of Adams Dairy, 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964).
29. See, Consolidated Aircraft Corp., 47 N.L.R.B. 494 (1943) ; and Crown
Zellerbach Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 753 (1951).
30. See, National Dairy Products Corp., 126 N.L.R.B. 434 (1960); and United
Telephone Co. of the West, 112 N.L.RLB. 779 (1955).
31. See, Vickers Inc., 153 N.L.RB. No. 45 (1965).
32. See, Bemis Brothers Bag Co., 143 N.L.R.B. 1311 (1963).
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However, in the cases where an 8(a) (5) violation has been found,
there was not always some anti-union action on the part of the employer
pointed out by the Board, but in most of the cases there were anti-union
actions. For example, where the employer had refused even to discuss
the action either before or after it was carried out," where the employer
had asserted during negotiations that the collective-bargaining contract
prohibited the action taken,34 or where the employer had previously re-
fused to process grievances similar to the one before the Board, 5 the
Board has rejected the employer's argument that the Board should prop-
erly step aside to allow the matter to be arbitrated.
Of the cases found within the problem situation where the Board
decided the employer had violated section 8(a) (5), in only one did the
Board not mention some anti-union action on the part of the employer."
However, the nature of the unilateral change in this case was of such a
nature to be a "significant detriment" to the employees who had their
wages reduced, and consequently there was an actual change in the terms
and conditions of employment."
Presence of one or more of the factors is not always fatal to the
employer's defense. In Leroy Machine Co., Inc.,"5 the employer had acted
unilaterally in two separate areas. One of the unilateral actions was a
major change of the terms and conditions of emplonnent, 9 and the em-
ployer had tried previously to frustrate the arbitration process by refus-
ing to arbitrate this type of grievance. It is not surprising that the Board
found the employer had violated section 8(a) (5) and issued a bargain-
ing order over that unilateral action.
However, with respect to the other unilateral action,4" the employer
had never tried to frustrate the arbitration process and the unilateral
action was not a major change in the terms and conditions of employ-
33. See, Smith Cabinate Mfg. Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1506 (1c64).
34. See, Cloverleaf Division of Adams Dairy, 147 N.L.R.B. 1410 (1964).
35. See, Leroy Machine Co. Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964).
36. Huttig Sash & Door Co., Inc., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 67 (1965).
37. This is one of the considerations mentioned in American Oil Co., 155 N.L.R.B.
No. 64 (1965). Probably, the Board's reasoning is that where the grievance causes a
"significant detriment" to the employees or a major change in the conditions of
employment, it is better to force the parties to bargain to complete agreement than
allow the arbitrator to interpret vague or ambiguous language of the contract with the
result of possible irritation or conflict caused by his decision.
38. 147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964).
39. The first charge before the Board was that the employer had unilaterally
acted to set new rates of pay for new jobs without consulting the union. Leroy Machine
Co., Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964).
40. The second charge before the Board was that th,. employer had violated
§ 8(a) (5) when without first bargaining with the union he required certain employees
with bad work records to take physical examinations. Leroy Machine Co., Inc., 147
N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964).
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ment. Even though the Board found an 8(a) (5) violation with respect
to the first action, the Board decided that the broad management preroga-
tive clause gave the employer the right to carry out the second action
without first bargaining over the action."'
These factors are only significant in the unclear cases before the
Board where the language in the collective-bargaining contract could pos-
sibly be construed to give the employer the right to carry out the uni-
lateral action. It is in this hazy zone, between the obvious cases, that the
Board apparently struggles to find a legal argument upon which to build
its case after being subjectively swayed one way or the other. Without
placing these cases within this subjective framework of factors, the
Board's decisions appear confusing, contradictory, and perhaps arbitrary.
IV. RECENT FEDERAL CASES
Two cases have recently been decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals which reflect a new approach to the problem of whether the
Board can properly act where the alleged unfair labor practice is depend-
ent on the proper interpretation of the collective-bargaining contract.
In the first case, Square D Co. v. NLRB,42 the employer and the
union had a collective-bargaining contract which contained a grievance
procedure ending with binding arbitration. The contract also contained
a waiver of the duty to bargain clause' and a management prerogative
clause" which gave the employer the unlimited "right of management"
except where restricted in the agreement. A dispute arose when the em-
ployer unilaterally started a "group incentive plan" and refused to bar-
gain over the plan or supply the union with information about the plan.4
41. The collective-bargaining contract contained a management prerogative clause
which gave management the right to ". . . determine the qualifications of employees."
The Board construed this clause to allow the employer to require the employees to take
physical examinations without bargaining with the union. Member Brown agreed -with
the majority that the Board should not hear the case; however, he would stay action
until the arbitrator had decided the correct interpretation of the collective-bargaining
contract and then act accordingly rather than dismissing the case entirely. Member
Fanning dissented arguing that such language did not show a clear and unequivocal
contracting away rights in that area. With in interpretation such as this, it is question-
able if Member Fanning would ever find a unilateral action allowed by the collective-
bargaining contract. Leroy Machine Co., Inc., 147 N.L.R.B. 1431 (1964).
The Board's decision has reason in it. There is no reason to require collective
bargaining over such an insignificant question especially in light of the management
prerogative clause. If a management prerogative clause is to have any meaning or
purpose there must be a point where the employer can carry out activity on the strength
of broad general language.
42. 332 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1964).
43. See note 9 .upra.
44. See note 8 supra.
45. It should be noted that although there was unilateral action involved in this
case, the main issue before the Board was the union's right to acquire information
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The union filed 8(a) (5) and (1) charges, and the Board decided against
the employer and ordered the employer to bargain.4
On appeal, the employer argued that an arbitrator must first deter-
mine if the union had by the terms of the contract waived its rights to
require collective bargaining with respect to establishment of the group
incentive plan before the Board could determine if the employer had com-
mitted a violation of section 8(a) (5) by refusing to supply the union
with the requested information. The Board argued that it has sole juris-
diction on all unfair labor practices by statutory decree' and the Steel-
workers Trilogy did not lessen the Board's power. The Board pointed out
that since the Trilogy only limited federal courts in their interpretation
and review of arbitration decisions, they had no application to the Board's
position in the case at bar. The Board also cited Timkin Roller Bearing
Co. v. NLRB"s in support of their position.
The Court of Appeals reversed the Board and refused to enforce the
Board's order. Timkin. was distinguished because in that case there was
no express waiver of the duty to bargain clause in the collective-bargain-
ing contract. The court recognized the Board's pre-emptive power in
cases where the rights contained in the collective-bargaining contract and
the statutory rights in the NLRA were the same, but the court pointed
out that the ". . . existence of an unfair labor practice . . . is dependent
pertinent to the unilateral action so the union will be better able to present a case when
the grievance involving the unilateral action is arbitrated. This should be distinguished
from the problem involved in this note where the dispute before the Board is whether
the unilateral action is allowed.
The question of Board action to require the employer to supply information when
there is an arbitration clause in the collective-bargaining contract is beyond the scope of
this note. See generally, Hercules Motor Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 1648 (1962) ; and Sinclair
Refining Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 732 (1963).
46. Square D Co., 142 N.L.R.B. 332 (1963), rev'd, 332 F.2d 360 (9th Cir. 1964).
47. The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act) § 10(a), 49 Stat. 453 (1935),
29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1964). "The Board is empowered, a. hereinafter provided, to
prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce.
This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that
has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwi3e. .. ."
48. 325 F2d 746 (6th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 971 (1964). In this case
there was a dispute concerning a wage rate change. The union filed grievances concern-
ing the change and subsequently asked for "wage data" concerning the methods used
by the employer to set the new wage rates. The employer refused to supply the data
and the union filed 8(a) (5) charges with the Board. Therc was no dispute that the
employer could make wage rate changes in certain "circum3tances" and the question
in the grievance was whether these "circumstances" were present. The question before
the Board was the same question in Square D Co., that is, whether the union could
demand and acquire information to be used during the arbitration of the grievance.
The employer argued that there was a waiver of the duty to bargain in this case because
the union had failed to gain an inclusion of a clause concerning wage data in the
collective contract. The court upheld the Board saying there must be a "clear and
unmistakable" relinquishment of the right to require the employer to supply the
information.
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upon the resolution of a preliminary dispute involving only the interpre-
tation of the contract."49 Therefore the Board could not properly decide
the question until the question of whether the union had waived its rights
to require collective bargaining had been arbitrated.
Shortly after deciding Square D, C & C Plywood Corp."° was ap-
pealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.5 The employer again as-
serted that the unilateral action was taken in a good-faith belief that it
was allowed by the collective-bargaining contract, and even if the
collective-bargaining contract did not expressly permit the action the only
issue presented to the Board was the proper interpretation of the
collective-bargaining contract. Therefore the employer contended the
matter was not properly before the Board on an unfair labor practice
charge.
The court noted that the Board was compelled to construe the
collective-bargaining contract. Therefore, the Board's holding that the
charges did not arise out of the interpretation of the collective-bargaining
contract was rejected." The court thought it undeniable that the con-
troversy before the Board was the correct interpretation of the manage-
ment prerogative clause. Since interpretation of the management prerog-
ative clause was necessary to establish an unfair labor practice, the charges
before the Board did not turn "entirely" on the provisions of the NLRA.
"[T]he very existence of the alleged unfair labor practice is "dependent
upon the resolution of a preliminary dispute involving only the interpreta-
tion of the contract.' "s
In Square D the court pointed to the waiver of the duty to bargain
clause as the clause which had to be interpreted by the arbitrator before
the Board could properly determine if there was an unfair labor practice.
In this case, however, the court did not address itself to the waiver of the
duty to bargain clause, but decided the management prerogative clause
must be interpreted before the Board could properly determine if there
49. Square D. Co., v. N.L.R.B., 332 F.2d 360, 365-66 (9th Cir. 1964).
50. 148 N.L.R.B. 414 (1964).
51. N.L.R.B. v. C & C Plywood Corp., 351 F.2d 224 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. granted,
U.S.L. WEEK 3356 (U.S. April 19, 1966).
52. "We note, moreover, that the rational of the Board majority in construing the
contract as it did was as unique as it was circuitous. The course of reasoning was that
the provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement are 'so contrary to labor relations
experience' that the union should never have executed such a contract; and since the
provisions in question should never have been agreed to by the union, it must be
presumed that the union did not intend them, since the union's 'prompt protest against
Respondent's posting of the new wage schedule . . . belies any such intent."' N.L.R.B.
v. C & C Plywood Corp., 351 F.2d 224, 227 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 34 U.S.L.
WEEK 3356 (U.S. April 19, 1966).
53. N.L.R.B. v. C & C Plywood Corp., 351 F.2d 224, 227 (9th Cir. 1965).
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had been an unfair labor practice. Therefore, it is possible that the Ninth
Circuit would not require a waiver of the duty to bargain clause to be
contained in the collective-bargaining contract to refuse to enforce a
Board order where it was necessary to interpret the collective-bargaining
contract before an unfair labor practice could be found.
Although the Board's reasoning in this case was tenuous, it may
be that the Board's result was correct. There was no arbitration clause
in the collective-bargaining contract in this case. Therefore, the only
method available to the union to acquire an interpretation of the collective-
bargaining contract was by a section 301 (a) suit in federal court. The
Steelworkers Trilogy established the policy that art itration is to be pre-
ferred over federal court interpretation of collective-bargaining contracts.
Square D was a continuation of that policy to situations where the ques-
tion was between Board interpretation and arbitration interpretation.
C & C Plywood, on the other hand, introduces fle policy that federal
court interpretation is to be preferred over Board interpretation. The
court pointed to the Steelworkers Trilogy in Square D in support of the
contention that the rights under the collective-bargaining contract should
first be arbitrated. Therefore, Square D is of questionable support of
C & C Plywood where there was no arbitration clause.
Assuming Square D is not properly used to support the court's deci-
sion, the question remains if C & C Plywood presents a persuasive argu-
ment. Since there was no arbitration clause in the collective-bargaining
contract there was no system of self-government established by the par-
ties. The problem was therefore not one of trying to maintain the parties'
working labor-management relationship. Moreover, the employer's re-
fusal to follow the Board's order to cease and desist from the unilateral
action resulting in a petition for enforcement by the Board indicated a
poor labor-management relationship between the parties. Such action
also shows a lack of good faith on the part of the employer.
In such a situation, where the collective-bargaining contract is cap-
able of several different interpretations, it seems more persuasive that the
federal policy toward labor relations would be furthered by requiring the
parties to meet over a collective bargaining table to resolve their differ-
ences in a mutually acceptable manner rather than forcing a possible literal
interpretation by a judge who unlike an arbitrator views the case without
the benefit of the full industrial context.
V. THE FEDERAL LOGIC AND ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PRESENT
TREND IN FAVOR OF ARBITRATION
In 1960 the Supreme Court handed down decisions in three closely
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
related cases known as the Steelworkers Trilogy." These three cases con-
tinue to have profound effect on the judicial approach to labor arbitra-
tion, and in their broadest sense they advance the policy that labor arbi-
tration enjoys a prominent position in labor law.
There has been a great deal of written discussion of the Trilogy ana-
lyzing the substance of the cases and the possible long range effects, but
basically the substantive doctrines of the cases can be boiled down to the
following:
(1) The existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate, and the
arbitribility of a specific grievance sought to be arbitrated un-
der such an agreement, are questions for the courts ultimately
to decide (if such an issue is presented for judicial determina-
tion) unless the parties have expressly given an arbitrator the
authority to make a binding determination of such matters.
(2) A court should hold a grievance non-arbitrable under a
valid agreement to use arbitration as the terminal point in the
grievance procedure only if the parties have clearly indicated
their intention to exclude the subject matter of the grievance
from the arbitration process, either by expressly so stating in
the arbitration clause or by otherwise clearly and unambiguously
indicating such intention.
(3) Evidence of intention to exclude a claim from the arbi-
tration process should not be found in a determination that the
labor agreement could not properly be interpreted in such a man-
ner as to sustain the grievance on its merits, for this is a task
assigned by the parties to the arbitrator, not the courts.
(4) An award should not be set aside as beyond the authority
conferred upon the arbitrator, either because of claimed error in
interpretation of the agreement or because of alleged lack of
authority to provide a particular remedy, where the arbitral de-
cision was, or might have been the result of the arbitrator's in-
terpretation of the agreement; if, however, it was based not on
the contract but on an obligation found to have been imposed
by law, the award should be set aside unless the parties have
expressly authorized the arbitrator to dispose of this as well as
any contract issue."
54. United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960);
United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960) ; United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960).
55. (Emphasis added.) Smith & Jones, The Supreme Court and Labor Dispute
Arbitration.: The Emerging Federal Law, 63 MICH. L. REv. 751, 759-60 (1964-65).
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Because the Steelworkers Trilogy was the first major attempt by the
Supreme Court to place arbitration in a favored judicial position, the
Court went to lengths to point out the reasons for its decision. The
Court said that collective-bargaining contracts are not analogous to ordi-
nary contracts since they reflect an industrial context in which they were
made." The arbitrator, who is aware of this industrial context, is better
able to interpret the collective-bargaining contract than a judge isolated
from the operation and history of the particular employer-union relation-
ship. 7  It seems obvious that the Court feared a literal reading of collec-
tive-bargaining contracts would not reflect the true meaning of the col-
lective agreement in a particular employer-union context.
The Court desired to push toward a method of settling labor man-
agement grievances which would achieve the congressional goal of in-
dustrial peace. This goal, the Court decided, could best be achieved by
letting the parties settle the grievances by a procedure established by the
parties themselves. By enforcing arbitration awards without wide lati-
tude in court review the parties would accept the arbitrator's decision
more readily thus promoting a form of self-government within the
industry.
This system of self-government is desirable in the Court's opinion
because the parties can work out rules and solutions which are acceptable
to both, thereby reducing to a minimum economic warfare and the re-
sulting economic waste. The ideal sought is one of labor and manage-
ment working together with minimum friction and maximum benefit to
both.
The Court also pointed out that arbitration is itself a form of col-
56. The Supreme Court quoted from Walker, Life i, the Automatic Factory,
36 HA v. Bus. Rsv. 111, 117, which said in part: "Persons unfamiliar with mills and
factories-farmers or professors, for example--often remark" upon visiting them that
they seem like another world. This is particularly true if, as in the steel industry, both
tradition and technology have strongly and uniquely molded the ways men think and act
when at work . . . a miniature society. . . . He discovers that the society of which
he only gradually becomes a part has of course a formal government of its own-the
rules which management and the union have laid down-but that it also differs from
or parallels the world outside in social classes, folklore, ritual, and traditions." United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960).
57. The Supreme Court cited Cox, Current Problems h' the Law of Grievance
Arbitration, 30 RocKY MT. L. REv. 247 (1957-58), in which Professor Cox gives his
reasons why arbitration decisions should not be subject to court review. He states
that collective agreements are not like other contracts, "their meaning is governed by
the 'unstated assumptions' and the 'vast store of amorphous methods, attitudes, fears
and problems.' In statutory interpretation the plain meaning rule has yielded much of
its rigidity to a willingness to project the policy upon the specific occasion . . . yet
judges who are not familiar with industrial relations and who have still less chance of
familiarizing with the background of the contract, if they intrude into merits, are
driven to reliance upon the words." Id. at 262.
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lective bargaining, and promoting collective bargaining is one of the
goals of the National Labor Relations Act.5"
Because the goal sought is continuing industrial peace and stability
with the resulting end of economic warfare and economic waste," the
Supreme Court reasoned that the best method to achieve such a goal is
for the parties themselves to create a workable system of self-government
whereby they can resolve their differences in their own mutually agree-
able manner. 0 The logic of the federal courts appears to place this goal
as their first premise.
The second premise in the federal logic that evolves from the Steel-
workers Trilogy is that arbitration is the best method of achieving this
system of self-government which will eventually result in industrial peace
and stability."' The Court believes ". . . arbitration is a stabilizing in-
fluence only as it serves as a vehicle for handling any and all disputes that
arise under the agreement."82 With industrial peace as the goal, the Su-
preme Court sees the choice as ". . . between having that relationship
governed by an agreed-upon rule of law or leaving each and every matter
subject to a temporary resolution dependent solely upon the relative
strength, at any given moment, of the contending forces." 8  Therefore
the Court reaches the result that arbitration of all grievances arising under
the collective-bargaining contract is the best method of achieving indus-
trial peace.
With this broad language in mind the logical conclusion resulting
from the two premises is that arbitration should be strengthened and en-
couraged in all situations. Even in the problem area posed by this note,
arbitration is to be preferred under the Supreme Court's reasoning over
58. "For arbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is
part and parcel of the collective bargaining process itself." United Steelworkers of
America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
59. "The present federal policy is to promote industrial stabilization through the
collective agreement." United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation
Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
"A collective bargaining agreement is an effort to erect a system of industrial
self-government." Id. at 580.
60. "A major factor in archieving industrial peace is the inclusion of a provision
for arbitration of grievances in the collective bargaining agreement." Id. at 578.
61. "But the grievance machinery under a collective bargaining agreement is at the
very heart of the system of industrial self-government. Arbitration is the means of
solving the unforeseeable by molding a system of private law for all the problems
which may arise and to provide for their solution in a way which will generally accord
with the variant needs and desires of the parties. The processing of disputes through
the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content are given
to the collective bargaining agreement." (Emphasis added.) Id. at 581.
62. (Emphasis added.) United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co.,
363 U.S. 564, 567 (1960).
63. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior and Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574, 580 (1960).
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Board action, the fear being that the Board's decision may disrupt the
working system of self-government and thereby result in a disruption of
industrial peace.
It would appear from the trend of recent case364 that the Supreme
Court may be laying the foundation for a future decision that would ex-
clude the Board from acting on matters encompassed in the collective
contract and require the Board to stay action on any alleged unfair labor
practices until the rights of the parties under the agreement have been
decided by arbitration. Such decisions as Square D and C & C Plywood
show a significant trend by the lower federal courts in this direction.
To evaluate the desirability of the present trend of the law and the
possible future conclusion in this area one must critically analyze the
premises on which it is based. There is little to say against the first
premise of the Supreme Court that industrial peace can best be achieved
by a workable system of self-government.
It is the second premise that arbitration of "zany and all" disputes
which arise under the agreement is the "only" way arbitration can be
made a stabilizing influence in labor relations which causes problems.
Such a premise is weak, if for no other reason, bccause of its absolute
terms. In no area of law can only one solution be the answer to all prob-
lems. The very heart and strength of our legal system is the broad con-
cept that the rule that should be applied is the rule which best affords a
result consistent with the reason behind the rule.
It is submitted that arbitration, while it does to a great degree further
the ideal of a workable system of self-government, is not to be preferred
in all cases where grievances arise under the collective-bargaining contract.
If arbitration is to further a workable system of self-government
two requirements are necessary. First, the parties must want to arbi-
64. Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have followed and extended the Court's
policy toward arbitration. In Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co., 369
U.S. 95 (1962), the Court in a cursory fashion using a footnote to the decision disposed
of the question of pre-emption by the Board where a pariy was trying to enforce
under § 301 (a) an arbitration clause in a collective-bargaining contract over a grievance
that was arguably an unfair labor practice.
Lucas Flour was subsequently strengthened in Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371
U.S. 195 (1963), where the court held that federal court jurisdiction was not displaced
even if the alleged grievance was "concededly" an unfair lab)r practice. The Supreme
Court refused to pass on the question of jurisdiction where the Board and the arbitrator
simultaneously rendered conflicting decisions on the same grievance and merely stated
. we shall face those cases when they arise." Id. at 198.
Another area, unit representation, which had formerly ben a sole function of the
Board has been dualized in Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964),
where the Court held that the union could force arbitration of the representation
question under § 301(a) of the L.M.R.A. However, in this case the Court noted that:
"Should the Board disagree with the arbitrator . . . the Board's ruling would of course
take precedence." Id. at 272.
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trate the grievance at least to the point where they will accept the arbitra-
tor's decision.6" Second, there must be a competent arbitrator who has
the confidence of both parties.66 This is not to say that the parties must
be in perfect harmony before arbitration will successfully implement
self-government,67 but it is manifest that arbitration cannot implement or
maintain a system of industrial self-government where the arbitrator's
decision will cause further disputes and irritation.68  As Dean Shulman
stated, a wrong decision "by an arbitrator may cause more harm by dis-
turbing the parties continuing relationship than by the injustice in the
particular case." 69
As a result of the Steelworkers Trilogy an arbitrator's decision is
harder to upset than either a court or Board decision. Both the courts'
and the Board's decisions are subject to review on appeal. However,
the Steelworkers Trilogy limits the area of court review to the question
of arbitribility where the grievance is under the contract. Where the
arbitrator through incompetence or through honest error makes the wrong
decision or one which will act to disrupt the existing system of self-
government there is practically no way to reverse this decision if the
grievance was one which could properly be arbitrated under the agreement.
The scope of the dispute between the parties will significantly deter-
mine the long range effect of an arbitrator's decision. If a dispute arises
over some unilateral action by the employer which is of such a nature or
magnitude that it will significantly affect the union's position, a decision
by the arbitrator allowing continuation of the action cannot help but
65. "The important question is not whether the parties agree with the award
but rather whether they accept it, not resentfully, but cordially and willingly. . . . But
general acceptance and satisfaction is an attainable ideal. Its attainment depends upon
the parties' seriousness of purpose to make their system of self-government work, and
their confidence in the arbitrator." Shulman, op. cit. supra note 6, at 1019.
66. "That confidence will ensue if the arbitrator's work inspires the feeling that
he has integrity, independence, and courage so that he is not susceptible to pressure,
blandishment, or threat of economic loss; that he is intelligent enough to comprehend
the parties' contentions and empathetic enough to understand their significance to them;
that he is not easily hoodwinked by bluff or histrionics; that he makes earnest effort
to inform himself fully and does not go off half-cocked; and that his final judgment
is the product of deliberation and reason so applied on the basis of the standards and
the authority which they entrust to him." Ibid.
The ". . . autonomous rule of law and reason . . . relies upon wholehearted
acceptance by the parties and requires a congenial and adequate arbitrator, . . . who
is neither timid nor rash and feels a responsibility for the success of the system."
Id. at 1023-24.
67. The parties may "... differ with one another and they may differ with the
arbitrator. But disagreement with the arbitrator by one or the other of the parties
is normal and expectable and of itself, not at all unhealthy." Id. at 1018.
68. "The interpretation no matter how right in the abstract, is self-defeating and
harmful to both sides if its day to day application provides further occasion for con-
troversy and irritation." Ibid.
69. Ibid.
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cause future friction and irritation between the parties. If the whole is-
sue sought to be arbitrated is in the hazy zone of collective-bargaining
contract interpretation, and if an adverse result to one or both of the
parties will act to tear down the system of self-government of the parties,
it would seem more reasonable to require the parties to re-enter negotia-
tion until a mutual solution to the question could be reached.7"
If one accepts the argument that arbitration is not the best method
of maintaining a workable system of industrial self-government in all
cases where a grievance arises under the collective-bargaining contract,
one is left with the problem of formulating a set of criteria to determine
in what situations the Board should exercise its jurisdiction instead of
first allowing arbitration of the grievance.
The problem situation toward which this note is directed unlike other
grievances which could arise under the contract and could also arguably
be violations of sections 8(a) (2), (3) or (4), assumes the only viola-
tion which could be found would be sections 8 (a) (5) and (1). This
of course means the remedy enforced by the Board would be an order to
bargain collectively. The choice therefore is between allowing arbitra-
tion of the grievance with possible subsequent Board action on any matter
not covered by the arbitrator's decision, or immediate Board action to
force collective bargaining without arbitration.
It is submitted that the criteria used by the Board in their decision of
whether to act or step aside for arbitration, and tlhe criteria which the
courts should use to determine whether to enforce the Board's order to
bargain collectively should be directed toward the determination of which
action will best promote and maintain the parties' working system of self-
government. Since a workable system of self-government is the eventual
goal ascribed to, it follows that any judgment should be based on deter-
mining which tribunal will best affectuate this goal ia the particular case.
The following criteria are submitted as a possible set that should be
used by the Board when deciding between acting or r,!fusing to act so that
the parties can arbitrate the grievance.7  When the contract shows the
70. "... [W]hen the system works fairly well, its value is great.... When
their autonomous system breaks down, might not the parties b tter be left to the usual
methods for adjustment of labor disputes rather than to court actions on the contract
or on the arbitration award?" Id. at 1024.
See also, Cox, op. cit. supra note 21, at 1491. "Once a contract is executed the
pressure to maintain it is so great that the arbitrator can hardly acknowledge that
since there was no meeting of the minds upon the question tefore him, there was no
contract, and therefore the parties should go back and negotiate a solution."
71. These criteria assume that there is language in the contract which could be
interpreted either for the employer or for the union and the main issue is who should
make this determination. In the obvious cases where the controctual language is capable
of only one interpretation, the contractual language should control. If the contract
475
INDIANA LAW JO URNAL
parties have previously bargained over an arbitrable grievance arising
under the contract resulting from the employer's unilateral action and
subsequent refusal to bargain, and where it appears from the facts and
circumstances of the case that the parties have a system of self-govern-
ment which has worked effectively in the past and has a substantial
chance of continuing to succeed in the future if the parties are allowed to
arbitrate the grievance, and the grievance itself is not one of such magni-
tude to the position of the other party that an adverse decision by the
arbitrator will act to disrupt the system, the Board should step aside and
allow the parties to settle the dispute in the manner provided in their
collective-bargaining contract.
However, where it appears the parties have not previously bargained
over a grievance resulting from the employer's unilateral action, or the
parties have not established a workable system of self-government, or
their system of self-government has broken down, or a decision by
the arbitrator will cause irritation or undermine one of the parties' posi-
tions and thereby tear down the existing system of self-government,
there is no reason for the Board to step aside and a more desirable result
will be achieved by Board action, that is, forcing the parties to bargain
collectively until a mutually acceptable result is reached.
Although the Board has not formally articulated such a position, it
is thought that in most cases the criteria suggested above closely ap-
proximate the position taken by the Board. As was pointed out above, the
factors used by the Board in their subjective analysis go directly to the
existing relationship between the employer and the union. There is no
reason for the Board to defer to arbitration where the employer has pre-
viously tried to frustrate the arbitration process, or where the employer
is carrying on a campaign to undermine the union, or where there will
be a "significant detriment" to the employees because of a substantial
change in the terms and conditions of employment. In all of these situa-
tions where there is an arguable case that the unilateral action was al-
lowed by the collective-bargaining contract, the Board's deference to ar-
bitration rather than requiring collective bargaining will in all probability
result in a substantial detriment to a working system of self-government
or an amicable relationship between the parties.
clearly allows the action then the parties have already bargained to agreement and the
Board should dismiss the charges. If the contract clearly does not allow the action
then the Board should find an 8(a) (5) violation and issue a collective bargaining order.
